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Abstract:  
Outsourcing has become a commonly accepted alternative of strategic management. But how do 
stockholders rate the corporate decision to divest parts of the former business? We study the stock 
market reaction of outsourcing announcements of the global financial services industry, using event 
study methodology and multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis. We analyze a sample of 162 
outsourcing transactions between 1997 and 2004 in order to investigate the drivers of excess returns 
to shareholders of outsourcers and insourcers in the global financial services industry. The analysis 
studies the impact of independent variables, the driving factors. Our findings indicate that many of 
these factors have significant explanatory power, indicating that capital market’s reaction to an 
outsourcing announcement might at least partly be forecasted. Partnering with experienced service 
providers significantly benefits the outsourcer. Evidence indicates that insourcers significantly benefit 
from large deals and transactions relating to traditional IT processes.  
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1 SOURCING, RISK AND THE FINANCIAL MARKET 
The examination of the outsourcing phenomenon, the process when a service provider takes ownership 
of corporate resources and manages those resources on behalf of the outsourcer (Kern et al. 2002), is a 
domain of the IS community for several years now. In recent times the questions "why to outsource" 
and "what to outsource" have been succeeded by the question "how to outsource", i.e. how to make 
best use of the opportunities enabled by the ability to use resources from outside the own company. An 
integral part of the "how"-question is an assessment of the risks associated with conducting 
outsourcing, multiple papers have been written on this issue and shed light on it from several different 
perspectives. We aim to extend this knowledge by adding the component of a neutral referee, the 
capital market. If publicly listed companies announce outsourcing deals, the capital markets react to 
this announcement. The reaction can either be positive or negative, depending on the assumptions of 
the investors regarding the impact on the business model of the outsourcing company and the bottom 
line benefits resulting from the deal. As the upcoming regulation of the "Basel II" capital accord 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004) requires banks to consequently measure their risks 
and provide capital to cover potential losses resulting from operations, the banking sector is positioned 
as a primary target for risk related research. As outsourcing naturally inherits a great deal of risk, the 
capital markets are assumed to pay special attention to the anticipated risk in the outsourcing deal and 
if it outweighs the potential chances (e.g. higher earning potentials), arising from outsourcing. 
Outsourcing is not a risk free business (for an overview on the risks of outsourcing identified in 
current IS literature see (Aubert et al. 1998; Quélin and Duhamel 2003)), nevertheless it is constantly 
on top of the corporate agenda. Recently published market surveys unanimously report outsourcing to 
be the bright spot in IT services for the years to come. Market research firm Gartner Group for 
example estimates the worldwide market for IT outsourcing to grow from 160 to 230 billion USD 
(from 2002 to 2007) and the market for business process outsourcing to expand even stronger from 
110 to 175 billion USD in the same time frame (Caldwell and Young 2003). Also academics share this 
view (Lancelotti et al. 2003; Lacity et al. 2004; Willcocks et al. 2004) and support the case of a market 
which is large and growing (Lancellotti et al. 2003), still requiring more research.  
The focus of this paper is on outsourcing activities of the global financial services industry. We chose 
that sector for two reasons: (1) This industry is the second largest buyer of outsourcing services, just 
after public bodies (Caldwell 2003). (2) The financial services industry has an immediate focus on 
risk, as several national and international regulatory bodies have issued legislations that enforce banks 
to re-think their risk management and incorporate operational risk, the risk of losses resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision 2004). This type of risk also applies to outsourcing.  
We used event study methodology and multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis to capture the 
reactions of the stock market, which is regarded as taking a neutral perspective, to analyze the 
perceived level of risk, inherent in an outsourcing decision. The outsourcing announcement is actually 
the first publicly available indication that two companies are engaging in sourcing arrangements. 
According to market information efficiency (Fama 1970), investors will act upon this newly available 
information and will adapt their stock trading strategies accordingly. We focus on a dedicated sector, 
the financial services industry and we do not restrict our sample to IT outsourcing but assess the full 
scope of strategic options also including application maintenance or business process outsourcing. By 
conducting this research we aim to provide researchers as well as practitioners with valuable 
information on how shareholders perceive the decision to engage in outsourcing projects and what the 
key drivers for a positive or negative reaction of the capital markets are. 
The paper is structured as follows: We provide an overview on the current state of research regarding 
outsourcing and event studies in related fields. Thereafter we developed hypotheses grounded by 
theoretical considerations and provide information on the methodology of our study. Finally we 
display the results and close the paper with a discussion and conclusion. 
2 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH 
The impact of outsourcing on people, organizations and information systems has fascinated 
researchers soon after the first outsourcing mega-deal (commonly regarded as being Kodak in 1989 
(Hirschheim and Dibbern 2002)) has been initiated. IS research has adopted the outsourcing 
phenomenon as an area of research interest since the last decade of the foregone century and its 
attractiveness to the IS community remains unbroken (Dibbern et al. 2004). Outsourcing research 
traditionally addresses three major questions: (1) why a corporation should employ outsourcing as a 
strategic tool, (2) what to outsource and (3) how outsourcing should be conducted (e.g. contractual or 
relationship matters)? The most current area of interest is the discussion of the possible implications of 
outsourcing. Authors are increasingly investigating also the undesirable outcomes of outsourcing and 
assess ways to avoid them. An early assessment of the risk of outsourcing has been conducted by (Earl 
1996), further active contributor to the discussion on this field are (Aubert et al. 1998; Currie 1998; 
Willcocks et al. 1999) from 1998 onwards investigating the risk factors to avoid when conducting 
outsourcing engagements. A review of the literature conducted by (Quélin and Duhamel 2003) 
revealed the main risks of outsourcing as identified in the relevant literature. They listed the 
dependence on the supplier, hidden costs, loss of know-how, service provider's lack of necessary 
capabilities and social risk as the topmost named risks. For this paper we exclude the assessment of 
social risk which has been classified by Quélin and Duhamel as only regionally important in practice.  
Several empirical studies have been conducted in comparable fields. In the following we highlight the 
most important ones for our topic and give a brief abstract of their key findings. (Hunton et al. 2000) 
analyzed a sample of 77 information systems IS outsourcing announcements between 1990 and 1997. 
They found evidence that capital markets react positively on the announcements and abnormal returns 
were greater for smaller firms than for larger firms (defined by the market value). (Gilley and Rasheed 
2000) studied the effect of outsourcing of peripheral and near-core tasks on a firm’s financial and non-
financial performance. They find no significant direct effect of outsourcing, but conclude that 
outsourcing interacting with corporate strategy and environmental dynamism has an effect on firm 
performance. (Glassman 2000) examined 27 companies which undertook large information 
technology outsourcing initiatives between 1993 and 1999. Focus of this study was on IT mega deals. 
The author found an average gain in shareholder value of 5.7 per cent over the general market trend 
from two months prior to two months after the announcement (abnormal return). Glassman concluded 
that outsourcing creates value to shareholders as outsourcing has become a management technique that 
can reduce risk and increase flexibility by making costs variable. (Albright 2003) built on the study 
provided by Glassman. The research timeframe has been extended to cover a data set of 45 deals from 
1993 to 2002. Similar to the previous study, Albright concluded that outsourcing has a positive effect 
on shareholder value. Additionally, he concluded that selective outsourcing is the superior strategy. 
(Farag and Krishnan 2003) examined information technology outsourcing deal announcements 
between January 1994 and August 2001. They concluded that capital markets react positively to IT 
outsourcing announcements of IT industry firms and service industry firms. They find positive market 
reactions to strategic sourcing projects, but not for cost-cutting projects. (Oh and Gallivan 2004) 
analyzed a sample of 97 information technology outsourcing deal announcements between 1998 and 
2001. Contrasting prior research, they find only weak evidence with respect to investors’ positive 
reaction to IT outsourcing announcements. Specifically, they detect that abnormal returns are 
negatively associated with asset specificity and with contract size. They found no evidence regarding a 
significant association of abnormal returns and contract duration or between abnormal returns and 
cost-reducing IT outsourcing announcements. 
3 HYPOTHESES  
Our research approach aims to conjoin the risks of outsourcing as identified in IS-literature with 
theoretical constructs adopted from agency theory. We assume that the capital market assesses both 
considerations and thus derive the level of risk inherent to a specific transaction. Furthermore we 
assume that an investor’s decision to invest or divest is to a large extent influenced by the level of risk 
as perceived by the stockholders. Higher risk levels can be associated with potential divestments while 
a lower level might lead to an increasing investment in the company. 
Size of contract: The resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Cheon et al. 1995) 
argues that companies exchange resources to reduce uncertainty and to increase their ability to 
compete with other market participants. Outsourcing in order to secure external resources or 
capabilities is a manifestation of resource dependency between client and vendor. The monetary size 
of the contract is expected to play a significant role in determining the level of dependency  (Oh and 
Gallivan 2004). Thus, as contract volume increases, the outsourcer becomes more dependent on the 
vendor. Additionally, monitoring costs and contract volume are positively correlated (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). We measure this source of risk by the deal size (agreed contract volume). 
Hypothesis 1: Due to increased dependency, higher monitoring costs and general risks of large 
projects, investors are expected to react negatively towards larger sourcing announcements.  
Duration of contract: Considering the dynamism at which business processes and technologies 
become outdated signing a long-term contract with a service provider may be risky. Not only business 
uncertainty, but also technological uncertainty exacerbates the risk of long-term contracts, due to the 
potential for technological discontinuities. The proposed duration of the contract plays a significant 
role in many types of outsourcing arrangements (Oh and Gallivan 2004). Companies engaging into 
long-term contractual arrangements face increased risks as they lose flexibility to react on future 
developments (Willcocks and Lacity 1999; Lacity 2002; Young and Hood 2003). A worst case 
scenario locks the client in to a poorly-performing vendor, constraining the client’s flexibility (Oh and 
Gallivan 2004). In fast-changing market environments frequent strategic changes might be essential to 
maintain a superior market position. In addition, being legally bound to a service provider prevents the 
outsourcer from assessing newer technologies or business concepts and benefiting from superior 
offerings and services already available in the market place.  
Hypothesis 2: We expect investors to react negatively towards outsourcing contracts having a 
long duration.  
Deal complexity: Recently, the focus has shifted from characteristics of the ideal outsourcing contract 
to the practicalities of actually making outsourcing relationships work. Researchers have developed 
differentiations to describe various philosophies of managing outsourcing relationships. (Fitzgerald 
and Willcocks 1994) propose two extremes as “simple transactional contracts” and “full partnership-
based relations”. Initially, many outsourcing arrangements implied total outsourcing to a single vendor 
(Huber 1993; Venkatraman and Loh 1994). Today, however multi-vendor-deals receive wider 
attention (Currie 1998; Gallivan and Oh 1999). This can be attributed to greater propensity of firms to 
engage in selective or “smart” sourcing (Earl 1996; Lacity et al. 1996) or functional outsourcing 
(Grover et al. 1996). Multi-vendor outsourcing arrangements are now a common part of the 
outsourcing landscape (Gallivan and Oh 1999). As on one hand, the outsourcer might benefit from the 
advantages mentioned above, on the other hand balancing out for the downsides is needed. In order to 
measure the impact of the different deal constellations, we differentiate between simplistic one-to-one 
relationships and multi-vendor arrangements and measure the capital market reaction to both 
relationships. We measure this deal characteristic with a binary variable, “0” for deals including a 
single vendor, “1” for deals employing more than one vendor. 
Hypothesis 3: Outsourcers can reduce risks and increase their specific relationship power, 
therefore we expect capital markets to approve of deals including multi-vendor relationships. 
Experience of the service provider: Business experience is a relevant factor in leveraging economies 
of scale (Bain 1954). An experienced insourcer that has performed a multitude of deals is in a better 
position to leverage synergies and to benefit from economies of scale and scope. We thus expect that 
capital markets reward higher returns to deals that have been announced by an experienced service-
provider. Furthermore experienced vendors are assumed to have built in-house learning experience on 
avoiding the pitfalls of outsourcing projects (Willcocks and Lacity 1999; Lassig et al. 2003). This is 
expected to lead to a higher level of programmability (the ability to specify appropriate behaviour of 
the vendor in advance) due to experience in contract negotiations and possibly from failed contract 
clauses in the past. Also the risk that arises from a vendor pretending to have capabilities that in reality 
are not present is mitigated as this behaviour would probably have been noticed before in the market 
reducing the number of deals closed (Willcocks et al. 1999). Experience of the service provider is 
measured by the cumulated number of previously acquired deals. 
Hypothesis 4: Experienced service providers are in a better position to mitigate risks, therefore 
capital markets react positively towards deal announcements including experienced vendors. 
Transaction focus: Apart from cost considerations, outsourcing is also a strategic option for 
companies to concentrate on their core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Quinn and Hilmer 
1994). The resource based view argues that a firm’s competitive advantage is build on skills and 
resources that are provided internally (Barney 1991; Grant 1991; Cheon et al. 1995). In this view, 
outsourcing of activities should be used as a temporary solution while companies build their own 
internal capabilities (Dragonetti et al. 2001). While not directly addressing the outsourcing decision, it 
is implied that outsourcing of non-core activities leads to saving resources (cash, time, staff, 
technological resources, managerial attention) to be used in core activities (Bettis et al. 1992; 
Dragonetti et al. 2001), ultimately leading to an enhanced competitive position (D'Aveni and 
Ravenscraft 1994). On the other hand, several authors have noted that outsourcing of core activities 
may lead to declining innovations (Kotabe 1990; Gilley and Rasheed 2000). We clustered business 
functionalities in four functional types in order to differentiate between core and non-core activities: 
IT-Infrastructure outsourcing (ITI), Application Development and Maintenance outsourcing (ADM), 
Administrative Processes outsourcing (APO) and, finally, Business Process outsourcing (BPO). 
(Friedrich and Gellrich 2004) have shown that outsourcing of ITI and ADM functions can be stated as 
“non-core”, while “typical” core financial processes are covered in APO and BPO. For service 
providers, traditional IT-related processes are scalable, flexible, homogeneous and usually 
standardized. Ultimately this leads to less complex integration projects associated with lower levels of 
risk. 
Hypothesis 5: We expect sourcing of non-core activities such as ITI and ADM to be rewarded 
by capital markets. We expect outsourcing announcements relating to core activities such as 
APO or BPO not to be approved by capital markets. 
Financial reliability of the service provider: A financially reliable vendor reduces the level of risk 
as the probability for a default and therefore the threat to the customer of not being able to produce its 
own services is reduced (Michell and Fitzgerald 1997; Lassig et al. 2003). A financially viable service 
provider becomes increasingly less risk averse, it therefore becomes attractive to pass risk from the 
customer to the vendor (Eisenhardt 1989), thus reducing the risk of the customer firm. Furthermore a 
financially stable vendor is generally more likely to be a reliable partner for the future of the 
engagement which reduces the risk of dependence on the service provider. As indicator for financial 
reliability we used the Return-on-Equity (RoE) of the service provider. A high RoE indicates that a 
company operates efficiently and profitable with its equity. 
Hypothesis 6: Vendors providing a positive financial performance bear less risk, therefore 
capital markets react positively towards deal announcements including service providers having 
a high RoE. 
An overview of analyzed factors and their interdependence with sourcing risk is provided in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Research model of current study 
4 METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE DESIGN AND DATA 
Using event study methodology including OLS regression and the market model we analyze 
outsourcing transactions announced by the financial services industry that have been publicly 
announced between January 1997 and March 2004. The event study methodology applied in this paper 
relies on the standard market model based approach suggested by (Fama et al. 1969), perpetuated by 
(Brown and Warner 1980; Brown and Warner 1985; MacKinlay 1997) and used by (Beitel et al. 
2004). As market indices we applied the MSCI World Banks, MSCI World Insurances and World 
Financial Services Index, according to the industry classification of the outsourcer; for the vendors we 
have used the S&P 500. We extracted all financial services by thorough research of outsourcing 
literature. Additionally, we conducted a comprehensive investigation of global financial newspapers 
included in LexisNexis using a variety of keywords such as “outsourcing in financial services”. This 
way we derived a unique database of financial services outsourcing deals covering a timeframe from 
January 1997 to March 2004 including a total of 272 deals in the global financial services industry 
with a deal volume larger than 10 million USD. To verify and complement relevant fundamental 
information for these 272 deals (e.g. event date, outsourcer, insourcer, type of deal, deal value) we 
extracted and evaluated the official first press announcement regarding the signing of the specific 
outsourcing contract. As the exact identification of the correct announcement date (i.e. event date in 
terms of this study) is crucial to provide correct results for this analysis, we spent extensive and 
comprehensive research regarding this issue. If we were unsure about the first press deal 
announcement or if we found evidence of information trickling we eliminated the observation since it 
is crucial for the event study to use the first date when the information reaches the market – otherwise 
results would be erroneous. The majority of the press releases were published on the outsourcer’s and 
insourcer’s investor relations websites. To complement this investigation we have also performed 
checks for any pre-announcements and for other events that might have additional effects on the 
specific company’s stock market performance (confounding effects). All financial services related 
industry specifications (i.e. Banking, Insurance, and Other Financial Services) were based on the 
specific Bloomberg classification. During the course of this study we will use this industry 
classification to provide further analysis.  
Of these 272 transactions no precise event date could be identified for 76 deals, for additional 14 deals 
the involved companies are not publicly listed (e.g. smaller private banks) so that no relevant financial 
data could be extracted. In order to account for outliers and to avoid a bias of the results we removed 
20 outlying observations (sensoring). Thus, our final verified data set includes 162 outsourcing 
transactions in the global financial services industry within the timeframe from January 1997 to March 
2004 and each transaction being larger than 10 mio USD. For 104 deals we were able to verify the 
fundamental information for both parties, i.e. outsourcer and insourcers. For 18 transactions, reliable 
data could be retrieved for the outsourcer only, for 40 cases for the insourcer only.  
These 162 transactions encompass 124 different financial services companies that have engaged into 
outsourcing activities, termed outsourcers in the context of this study, and 59 observations for service 
providers that have engaged into service providing activities, termed insourcers (or vendors) in the 
context of this study. Service providers are, on average, more profitable than outsourcers (Return-on-
Equity of 16.91 per cent vs. 14.05 per cent) also they are seem to be more cost efficient (Cost-Income-
Ratio of 63.08 per cent vs. 65.50 per cent). The average market-to-book-ratio (MTB) is 2.72 for 
outsourcers and 4.83 for service providers, while the average price-earnings ratio is 15.76 per cent and 
24.42 per cent, respectively (all data provided by Bankscope and Datastream). As outsourcers stem 
from the financial services industry and the vast majority of insourcers stems from the service 
providing industry, the different performance figures need careful interpretation. 
5 ANALYZED VARIABLES 
The absolute size of the outsourcing transaction is measured by the variable “deal size”. The contract 
value was available for 97 transactions. The average contract value is 595.27 million USD. The 
maximum value is 5bn USD, minimum value is 10 million USD. For outsourcers, the size of the 
contract reflects the amount of operational costs now sourced externally. For insourcers, the value 
reflects an additional revenue stream. The deal length of the transaction is measured by the variable 
“deal length”. The average deal length of transactions in our sample is available for 110 transactions, 
the mean is 7.51 years. Some outsourcing deals encompass more than one vendor (additional 
vendor). We find nine deals in our data sample containing more than one vendor. The sourcing 
business experience of an insourcer is measured by the total number of insourcing deals by a 
specific service provider. On average, insourcers in the sample have performed 13.8 insourcing 
transactions. We differentiate four different functional areas of financial institution’s outsourcing. 56 
deals are in the area of BPO, 5 in APO, 33 in ADM and 66 deals are in ITI (2 deals could not be 
categorized due to missing information). Return-on-Equity for the outsourcers is on average 14.40 
per cent, for the insourcers 16.40 per cent. As control variables we introduce several additional 
variables, i.e. the market capitalization of the sourcing partners, the ratio of the absolute deal size 
in relation to the market capitalization, the industry sector of the outsourcer as well as the year of 
the transaction. Table 2 provides an overview on the independent and control variables. 
6 RESULTS 
6.1 Event study results 
Cumulative abnormal returns for outsourcers and insourcers are presented in Table 1 in the appendix. 
Shareholders earn, on average, slightly negative (but mainly no significant) returns in most of the 
analyzed event windows. For the outsourcers we detect negative CARs in all analyzed event windows. 
For the event window [-1;1] we detect a significant negative CAR of -0.68 per cent. For the 
insourcers, we detect negative CARs in eight of the analyzed twelve event windows. The event 
window [-3;3] displays a significant positive CAR of 0.86 per cent. On a first glance, these results 
differ from previous related findings which mainly report positive cumulated abnormal returns. But 
readers should keep in mind that we focus on one industry (the financial services sector) and included 
not only IT-related sourcing announcements. Thus, our results are not really comparable to results 
from other studies focusing on various industries or cover only IT outsourcing (Glassman 2000; 
Hunton et al. 2000; Albright 2003). The following section provides results of the cross-sectional 
multivariate regression for outsourcers and service providers. 
6.2 Regression results 
Cumulated abnormal returns are analyzed separately for clients and service providers. Table 3 
provides an overview of the results for the total model. They have been generated using cross-
sectional multivariate OLS regression analysis. Relevant event windows have been taken according to 
significant results in the event study. Adjusted R2 are 0.23 and 0.33, for outsourcers and service 
providers, respectively. F-values are highly significant at 1.87 and 2.24. Figure 2 provides a detailed 









































Figure 2:  Overview: OLS-regression results 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that investors do not approve of large deals since they provide more potential 
for sourcing risks. Our results do not provide consistent support for the hypothesis. Outsourcers 
significantly benefit from large deals (positive coefficient at the 10 per cent level). Service providers, 
on the other hand, receive significant negative returns when engaging in large transactions. Obviously, 
at least for the outsourcers, investors seem to evaluate other factors positively associated with deal size 
and potentially outweighing the risks attributed with large deal volumes. As large deals provide more 
potential to leverage synergies they can create cost advantages a fact which also benefits the 
outsourcer. According to Hypothesis 2 we expected long deals to bear increased risks. For the 
outsourcers our analysis yields a significant negative coefficient. For outsourcers, investors do not 
approve of long deals. This finding supports our expectations. Though longer deals provide a stable 
structure for strategic business planning, the downsides (e.g. inability to source operations back in, 
strategic inflexibility and being locked in to service providers offering outdated technology) outweigh 
potential upsides. In Hypothesis 3 we formulated the expectation that deals including an additional 
vendor or sub-contractor provide potential for increased risks. Our results do not provide grounds to 
support this hypothesis. Outsourcers including an additional vendor into the transaction significantly 
benefit from this constellation. We find a positive and highly significant coefficient. Outsourcers that 
engage into multi-vendor relationships increase their specific relationship power and decrease their 
individual dependency risk. According to Hypothesis 4 we expected capital markets to react 
positively towards deal announcements including experienced service providers. Our results 
significantly support that hypothesis. Clients engaging in partnerships with experienced service 
providers are significantly rewarded by capital markets. Experience, counted as number of past deals, 
can be viewed as an appropriate proxy for risk-reducing qualities and abilities. For the service 
providers, our results are counter-intuitive, as the coefficient is significant, but negative. If a service-
provider has already closed a multitude of transactions investors might fear that an additional deal 
creates too much pressure on the already stretched organization. Hypothesis 5 suggests that sourcing 
of traditional IT-related services provide less risk potential. Our results show that service providers 
engaging in traditional IT-transactions (ITI, ADM) are significantly rewarded by investors. Provision 
of scalable, standardized homogeneous services which are less complex to integrate compared to 
typical finance processes is highly rewarded by investors on capital markets. In Hypothesis 6 we 
formulated that financially successful service providers account for less risk. Our empirical findings 
do not provide significant support for this hypothesis. Relating to another financial performance 
figure, our results suggest that service providers significantly benefit from transactions including 
clients that display a large cost-income-ratio. Sourcing in currently cost intensive operations is 
rewarded by investors as these operations provide a potential to harvest synergies and cost-reductions. 
6.3 Limitations of the study 
The premise of this study was, as for all event studies, that outsourcing is attributed with certain risks 
for the involved companies and that announcements provide information about future cash flows and 
have the potential to impact a company’s market value. Although a comprehensive attempt was made 
to control for confounding variables, all potentially confounding variables may not be considered in 
this study. For example, future studies could control for characteristics of risk sharing, incentives and 
penalties defined in the contract between the sourcing partners. Similarly, controlling for sourcing 
activities of the specific financial services company thus gaining a measure for the firm’s vertical 
integration and sourcing experience might be useful in future studies. For service providers market 
structures and environmental dynamism can be a fruitful area of further research. Generally, it can be 
stated that finding the “right” variables and providing appropriate concepts to operationalize the 
assumptions and hypotheses is a challenge in itself. We suggest this area as a topic for further 
academic research. The same holds true for measuring risk inherent to sourcing contracts. Although 
we measured risk with a variety of variables we were unable to provide any evidence that capital 
markets react adversely towards certain deal attributes. Again, this can be due either to employing 
incorrect variables or that capital markets are missing a comprehensive understanding of the risks 
inherent in outsourcing (or at least investors believe that potential upsides of sourcing arrangements 
outweigh potential downsides and risks).  
7 CONCLUSION 
The results of the study did not in every case match up with our expectations. Three insights are of 
special interest: 
(1) Partnering with experienced service providers significantly benefits the outsourcer. This implies 
that the stock markets react in a conservative way if it comes to large and risky projects such as 
outsourcing engagements. Senior management in charge of outsourcing decisions should bear this 
finding in mind when selecting the service provider. Capital markets perceive less risk when the 
insourcer is experienced. 
(2) Service providers significantly benefit from large deals. Although that insight may not come as a 
surprise it may well be useful for vendors and their pricing department. Therefore this knowledge may 
also benefit the outsourcer during contract negotiations. Though one might argue that large deals bear 
high potentials for operational risk for the vendor, they also provide increased potential to leverage 
synergies and uncover economies of scale. Obviously, these upsides outweigh risky downsides. 
(3) Service providers significantly benefit from deals relating to traditional IT processes. Once again 
the capital markets position themselves as conservative. This is interesting as the market for ITI is 
nowadays rather competitive thus resulting in diminishing margins. More and more service providers 
try to locate other areas for profit generation which are still not dominated by a multitude of capable 
vendors. One focus of interest is APO and BPO where numerous service providers are currently 
undertaking steps to enter these markets. It is noteworthy that the capital markets actually do not value 
these shift in vendor strategy. 
In conclusion our study provides beneficial ideas to academics as well as practitioners. Further 
insights are needed in order to understand complex sourcing relationships in the light of the influential 
factor of risk. Practitioners gain useful insights in order to maximize market impact (thus shareholder 
value) of their sourcing thus corporate strategies. 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the E-FinanceLab, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 
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Table 1: Event study results. Abnormal returns have been calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-
parameters have been estimated for a period of 252 trading days (1 trading year) 
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent level. 
 
Table 2:  Independent and control variables. 
 
 
Table 3:  Total model: OLS-regression results for the cumulated abnormal returns of outsourcers 
and service providers. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10 per cent level. 
